John F. X. Knasas has issued a series of philosophical and exegetical critiques of what he presents as the Cartesian subjectivism of “transcendental Thomism” in general and Bernard Lonergan in particular. But Professor Knasas’s spontaneous assumptions about knowing, objectivity, and reality are those of Descartes and Kant, not St. Thomas. He thus misinterprets St. Thomas and Fr. Lonergan and misconstrues the nature of knowing. The roots of the differences between Professor Knasas and Fr. Lonergan are exposed by contrasting two radically (...) opposed accounts of knowing, two correlative meanings of the term ‘real’, and two correspondingly divergent interpretations of St. Thomas. In the process, Professor Knasas’s repeated misrepresentation of Fr. Lonergan is corrected. (shrink)

Gaven Kerr argues that Lonergan is a metaphysical realist but follows an inherently idealist method. Furthermore, Kerr claims, Lonergan’s isomorphism of cognitional and ontological elements does not hold, because ontological act is not parallel to cognitional judgment. In so arguing, however, Kerr conflates ontological act with efficient causality, misunderstands the nature of the parallel asserted by Lonergan’s isomorphism, and involves himself in a priori speculation about the implications of Lonergan’s method. An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle, whereas “act” names (...) an intrinsic constituent of contingent being. The parallel between ontological and cognitional composition, moreover, and the isomorphism of ontological and cognitional elements, are subtler than Kerr appreciates. The suspicion, finally, that Lonergan’s method is somehow inherently idealist is idle and not borne out by the facts. (shrink)

In this article I propose to do five things. First, I describe the present confusion disturbing the tranquility of the American polity. Next, I hypothesize that an important source of civil confusion is that American civildiscourse is generally conducted in two different moral languages. Neither of these is adequate to the reality of the human good, and their speakers are, perhaps increasingly, given to misunderstanding one another. Third, I propose some reasons why not only misunderstanding but even outright hostility seems (...) to be growing. Fourth, I suggest that if we Christians are to be of genuine service to our fellow citizens, we have to begin by emancipating ourselves from inadequate moral languages and renew our capacity to function in a more properly Christian language. Finally, I suggest a possible contribution Christians might make to the renewal of civil discourse. (shrink)